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Abstract 
The article aims to study the grounds of humanitarian intervention, analyse the rationale behind the use of force for humanitar-
ian purposes in the context of international law while it lacks the clear-cut definition according to the UN Charter. In addition, the 
article examines the particular case of a humanitarian intervention that enables to comprehend the preconditions and criteria 
of intervention. It also looks at the controversial issues between the fundamental principles of international law and humani-
tarian intervention. The article clarifies the trends attempting to depict the aforesaid fundamental principles and humanitarian 
intervention as compatible institutions triggering the debates over establishing the humanitarian intervention as a customary 
law norm. 
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Introduction
Some scholars think that the humanitarian intervention could 
only be justified on the moral basis (Hall W.E., 1895, p. 309). 
According to the Declaration of UN General Assembly on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal 
Affairs of States, States should abstain from the armed inter-
vention against other States or group of States, military oc-
cupation or any other form of interventions, or from any act of 
military, political or economic interference into the internal af-
fairs of other State (Declaration of General Assembly, 1981). 
The States should refrain from the exploitation and the 
distortion of human rights issues as a means of interference 
in the internal affairs of States, of exerting pressure on other 
States or creating distrust and disorder within and among 
States or groups of States (Declaration of General Assembly, 
1981). Proponents of intervention counter by arguing that the 
establishment of the United Nations has “neither terminated 
nor weakened the customary institution of humanitarian in-
tervention.  First of all, the United Nations Charter emphati-
cally stresses the importance of human rights, and requires 
its members to enforce human rights standards.  As human 
rights have grown in importance in international law, it is no 
longer possible to rightly claim that human rights abuses with-
in the borders of a sovereign state are solely the “internal” 
affair of that state (Merriam J., 2001, p.121).
The costs in human suffering throughout the world out-
weigh the benefits of the illegality of humanitarian intervention. 
The previous legality of humanitarian intervention should be 
revisited. Collective security mechanisms that were supposed 
to render humanitarian intervention obsolete have never func-
tioned, and may never function, properly. These mechanisms 
therefore fail to prevent the occurrence of egregious human 
rights violations. The fear of potential abuse of the doctrine, 
while at one time legitimate, should no longer be the overrid-
ing concern in international law because modern technology 
enables states to detect pretextual invocations of the doctrine. 
The legality of humanitarian intervention under this scheme 
will not create incentives for the use of military force by gov-
ernments which were previously deterred from using force by 
humanitarian intervention’s illegality. Legalizing humanitarian 
intervention within certain limits strikes an effective balance 
between legitimate state sovereignty and the protection of hu-
man rights (Barry B., 1992-1993, pp. 157-158). 
Traditionally, the term “humanitarian intervention” de-
scribes the threat or use of force by a state or group of states, 
designed to compel a sovereign to respect fundamental hu-
man rights in the exercise of its sovereign powers (Scheffer 
D., 1991-1992, p.264). According to this classic definition, to 
qualify as “humanitarian,” the sole objective of the interven-
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tion must be to either end or prevent human rights violations 
(Farer T., 1991, p. 122).  The idea of humanitarian interven-
tion has expanded to cover interventions designed to ensure 
the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to populations in 
dire need, as in the case of Somalia in 1992. Whether restrict-
ed to protecting human  rights  against violations  committed 
by a sovereign or expanded to cover  the provision of as-
sistance, the classical definition of humanitarian intervention 
limits intervention to situations of pure humanitarian concern 
(Gordon R., 1996, pp.  43-45).
The Use of Force on Humanitarian Grounds 
Prior to the adoption of the United Nations Charter, a number 
of international military missions were undertaken for humani-
tarian reasons (Nowrot K.,Schabacker E., 1998-1999, 
p.372). 
The ratification of the United Nations Charter in 1945 
severely curtailed the legality of unilateral military actions, 
including humanitarian interventions. Article 2(4) clearly pro-
hibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state.” This basic principle of 
non-intervention, grounded in the norm of state sovereignty, 
regulates international interventions in the post-Charter era. 
A limitation on the principle of non-intervention recognized in 
the United Nations Charter is found in Chapter VII, which per-
mits the Security council to authorize the use of force upon a 
finding of a threat or breach of international peace or when 
necessary for self-defense. It appears that with the ratification 
of the United Nations Charter, humanitarian intervention is 
only justified when there is a clear finding that the humanitari-
an situation implicates international peace. Consequently, the 
possibility of unilateral or unauthorized intervention appears 
completely precluded by the United Nations 
Charter” (Nowrot K., Schabacker E., 1998-1999, p.373). 
In real-world practice, the UN is susceptible to the same 
sort of political pressures that any national legislative body 
faces, and thus quite often it will be unable to act even when it 
should. Supporters of intervention argue that the right to inter-
vene should remain as a stopgap measure to be used when 
the Security Council is deadlocked and immediate action is 
required. Ostensibly, this right to intervene will be strictly cir-
cumscribed and governed by international law (Merriam J., 
2001, p.123).
Traditionally, ´humanitarian intervention` is regarded as 
the use of military force in any form by a state against the 
other state targeted at coercing the latter to halt harsh viola-
tions of the human rights (Encyclopaedia of Public Interna-
tional Law, Edited by R. Bernhardt, 1992, p.926). 
The fact that the United Nations adopts the promotion 
of human rights among its purposes does not contradict this 
finding. Although there is no general agreement on how to 
resolve a possible conflict between the different purposes 
and principles of the Charter, the order in which the purposes 
and principles are set forth indicates a substantive priority. In 
both the Preamble and Article 1, the prevention of war and 
the maintenance of international peace and security are listed 
before the promotion of human rights. Thus, the United Na-
tions Charter expresses a clear hierarchy by declaring peace 
“as the supreme value.., more compelling even than human 
rights.” This does not mean human rights must always be sub-
ordinate to the maintenance of international peace and state 
sovereignty. It indicates, however, that the protection of hu-
man rights through military measures are primarily reserved 
to collective actions under the authority of the United Nations 
(Nowrot K. and Schabacker E., 1998-1999, pp.342-343). 
Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General (the 7th UN Sec-
retary General in 1997-2006) suggested the Security Council 
to examine the possibility of coercive intervention according 
to the following criteria: 1) the violation of human rights and in-
ternational humanitarian law; 2) ignoring the measures for the 
maintenance of peace; 3) the incapacity of local authorities 
to maintain order or their participation in violations; 4) limited 
and proportional use of military force which minimally affect 
local population (Helton A.C., Devecchi R. P., 2000, p.1).
Jacques Forster, Vice President of the Red Cross, in his 
keynote address at the Ninth Annual Seminar on Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law Geneva, March 2000, outlined the 
incompatibility of humanitarian action and military interven-
tion. According to Forster, there is a clear-cut line between 
the outcome of humanitarian action and excessive military 
act. The humanitarian action targets at halting a conflict. In 
other words, it aims to defend the dignity of people and pro-
tect their lives, however, not to solve a conflict. In the opinion 
of the International Red Cross Committee, the humanitarian 
action cannot change the political action. These two realms 
should be clearly distinguished. Based on the same opinion, 
the humanitarian action cannot have a coercive nature. The 
experience showed that the humanitarian involvement either 
in political or military actions escalates the conflict rather than 
suspends it. The humanitarian action is successful only if the 
participants of such action act within the territory in need ac-
cording to their regulations. Such environment is designated 
as ‘humanitarian area’. The military intervention is necessary 
in observance with the humanitarian law and for the purpose 
of creating the relevant environment for the humanitarian ac-
tion. The Humanitarian Intervention should not aim at military 
interventions (Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Humanitarian Law,  2000, pp.2-3).
Forster thinks that the use of military force by the interna-
tional community can be applied only within the scope of the 
UN Charter. The International Humanitarian Law cannot be 
used to justify a military intervention since it has nothing to do 
with the use of force. Its role is strictly determined and limits 
the legitimacy of the use of armed force. In the course of a 
humanitarian action, the principle of neutrality and independ-
ence should be observed necessary to gain trust of all par-
ties to the conflict. The peace can only be maintained by the 
actions framed within the mandate (Humanitarian Inter-
vention and International Humanitarian Law, , 2000, pp.2-3).
Preconditions and Criteria for the 
Humanitarian Intervention
Any framework proposed will have its critics; nevertheless, it 
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is not unreasonable to require certain basic criteria that must 
be met before a military operation can properly be called a 
humanitarian intervention (Merriam J., 2001, p.126).
The most common preconditions of humanitarian inter-
vention are: a) massive and gross violation of human rights; 
b) exhaustion of all possible means of settlement of a dispute
within the framework of the international law (Rukhadze N., 
2009, pp. 48-49).
The criteria, a humanitarian intervention is to comply 
with are as follows: a) the intervention is to be undertaken 
only for the humanitarian purposes; b) the intervention should 
be multilateral and c) the intervention should be proportional 
(Rukhadze N., 2009, pp. 48-49).
In legalizing humanitarian intervention, the international 
community should follow certain criteria in a two-part inquiry. 
The first level consists of two absolute prerequisites. First, a 
state should use military force unilaterally only when verifi-
able and extreme human rights abuses exist that “shock the 
conscience. Only when human rights abuses are extreme is 
humanitarian intervention completely justifiable and beyond 
moral debate. Second, this use of force should only occur 
when the international organizations fail to fully address and 
prevent the extreme abuses.  Collective action by the interna-
tional community is inherently legitimate and always prefer-
able to individual action (Barry B., 1992, pp.152-153).
The second level consists of supplemental caveats which 
do not have to be followed completely, but lend credibility to 
an intervention’s legitimacy. These caveats are probative of 
the altruistic nature of the intervention. These caveats include 
a preference for multilateralism, a minimum use of force com-
mensurate with preventing abuses, a relative disinterested-
ness by the intervenor in the affairs of the target state, and 
an exhaustion of peaceful measures to prevent the abuses. 
Because it is impossible to apply these caveats to every sce-
nario, these caveats should not become absolute prerequi-
sites (Barry B., 1992, p.153)
Determining the level of violations sufficient to justify in-
tervention presents a dilemma. Inevitably, any lower limit es-
tablished will meet with criticism from human rights groups. 
On the other hand, allowing intervention for any human rights 
violation is akin to having no doctrine at all; states may claim 
that policies that are counter to their own are “human rights 
violations” and elect to intervene. In order to justify military 
force, the human rights violations must meet two conditions. 
First, they must violate the highest norms of human rights - 
the right to life and the right to be free from physical abuse. 
Second, the violations themselves must be widespread and 
large in scale (Merriam J., 2001, p.129).
The term “human rights” encompasses a wide variety of 
physical, political, and economic rights, most of which were 
enumerated by the UN in the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights.  However, humanitarian intervention is a remedy 
designed only to protect the highest and most basic, physical 
human rights - the right to life, and the right to be free from 
torture and physical abuse. It would be hard to justify an ag-
gressive military action to protect the right to marriage,  the 
right to a free press,  or the right to unionize all of which are 
enumerated in the Declaration. While these rights are very 
important, they do not involve an immediate risk of physical 
injury or death, and they lack the urgency required to justify a 
war (Merriam J., 2001, p.130).
The source of the evidence is in many cases even more 
important for evaluating credibility than the content of the 
evidence. Ideally, the evidence provided will come from inde-
pendent sources without an interest at stake in the outcome 
of the crisis. The closest thing to such an independent source 
is the United Nations itself; in theory, the competing interests 
of all the member states ensure that it operates with objectiv-
ity. Other sources widely regarded as credible will include the 
various nongovernmental organizations dedicated to protect-
ing human rights, such as Helsinki Watch, Doctors Without 
Borders, and the International Red Cross. Finally, evidence 
provided by the intelligence agencies of the intervening state 
or organization can be used to augment the evidence pro-
vided by objective bodies. Evidence provided by a national 
intelligence agency may be suspect unless it is supported by 
evidence from other, disinterested sources (Merriam J., 2001, 
p.129).
To require that every other means must be exhausted 
would make every humanitarian intervention ineffective by 
virtue of being too late to prevent a tragedy. Exhaustion in 
the context of a humanitarian crisis should thus be a two-step 
process, with a “pre-crisis” phase and a crisis phase (Merriam 
J., 2001, p.131).
The sole objective of intervention must be to end the hu-
manitarian emergency and prevent its resurgence. The pur-
poses of the intervention should not be extended to include 
territorial conquest or liberation, the break-up of a state, or the 
toppling of a government. Such aims would destroy the dis-
interested humanitarian intent that is required for a legitimate 
intervention (Merriam J., 2001, p.133).
The use of force by the state should serve the protection 
of human rights when their lives and health are under threat. 
Therefore, according to the doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention, in order to consider the humanitarian intervention 
legitimate, it should be carried out for humanitarian purposes 
(Rukhadze N., 2009, pp. 53-54). 
The humanitarian intevention should be multilateral 
(Benjamin B., 1992-1993, pp. 152-154). The more states that 
are involved in the intervention, the greater the legitimacy of 
the intervention, and therefore the less likelihood of an abuse 
of the doctrine. However, this should not be understood to 
require the presence of more than one state’s military forces 
in the affected area. It may be that only one state will have the 
logistical capacity and requisite military power to intervene. 
Rather, this criterion requires that the endorsement of inter-
vention be multilateral (Merriam J., 2001, p.135-136). 
The criterion of proportionality should be observed during 
the humanitarian intervention. The humanitarian intervention 
should be followed by the stabilization of a situation. In other 
words, the intervention should not cause more severe conse-
quences rather than its non-application. For the legitimacy of 
the humanitarian intervention, it should be proportional to the 
degree of force used by another party (Rukhadze N., 2009, 
p. 56).
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The NATO Humanitarian Intervention 
in Kosovo 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization carried out the hu-
manitarian intervention in Kosovo, one of the former Yugo-
slavia provinces. Kosovo was mainly populated by Albanians 
who arrived from the neighbouring Albania and exercised the 
right to autonomy for many years. In 1989, this status was 
abolished that resulted in the resistance of Kosovo Albani-
ans followed by their armed rebellion. In response, the central 
authority applied more severe and bloody measures against 
them. Specifically, these measures increased the severity of 
ethnic cleansing (having commenced at the time of 
abolishing their autonomy). Consequently, the hundred 
thousand refugees created economic hardship in neigh-
bouring state (Alexidze L., Editor-In-Chief,  2003,  p.415)  
The joint measures of the UN, OSCE and NATO failed to 
generate any results. For the purpose of immediate dispute 
settlement, the NATO leadership decided to bomb the facili-
ties of law enforcement authorities and the human resources 
of the central government positioned in Kosovo to force them 
leave the region. In 1998, this threat made the President of 
Yugoslavia Milosevic to agree on the deployment of OSCE 
observation mission and other monitoring agencies in Koso-
vo. However, it also failed to halt severe resistance victimizing 
the peaceful civilians. Eventually, Yugoslavia refused to sign 
the agreement which envisaged the restoration of Ko-
sovo’s autonomy (Alexidze L., Editor-In-Chief,  2003,  pp. 
415-416). In March 1999, the bombings started from Ko-
sovo and continued beyond the entire territory of Serbia 
targeting the relevant facilities. It lasted for 78 days (Grant 
R., 1999, pp.  30, 37). The NATO air attack aimed at uncon-
ditional and safe return of the refugees (Merriam J., 2001, 
p.112).
The proponents of the doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion justify the intervention in Kosovo based on its humanitar-
ian purposes. 
The type of humanitarian crisis that prompts intervention 
is very likely itself a threat to state sovereignty. War crimes 
and crimes against humanity are crimes of universal jurisdic-
tion precisely because they have a profound effect on the in-
terests of all states. When war crimes go unpunished, they 
cause destabilization in surrounding states in the form of dis-
placed refugees and the spread of armed conflict, which may 
lead to a larger war. It is thus in the general interest of all 
states to cooperate to prevent and punish war crimes, in order 
to prevent the outbreak of war and the resulting economic and 
political upheaval. (Merriam J., 2001, pp.117-118).
Prior to the humanitarian crisis of Kosovo, there was con-
flict between the Serbian military forces and the Kosovo Lib-
eration Army for several years. The KLA attempted to protect 
the autonomy (the U.S. Department of State, 2000). 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
estimated that “the indiscriminate use of force by [Yugoslav 
forces] ... resulted in numerous civilian casualties and the dis-
placement of over 230,000 persons from their homes. The 
UNHCR increased its estimate, stating “the year-long conflict 
has driven 400,000 people out of their homes (Merriam J., 
2001, p.137).
According to the UN Security Council Resolution N 1199, 
50 000 refugees were left without shelter. The UNHCR re-
ported children “dying in the cold” (Merriam J., 2001, p.141).
The Kosovo operation was preceded by months of diplo-
matic efforts to resolve the region’s problems peacefully.  The 
United Nations, the OSCE, NATO, the US, and the Balkans 
“Contact Group”, all participated in increasingly urgent dip-
lomatic moves in an effort to curb the violence and reach a 
political solution (Merriam J., 2001, pp.142-143).
In September 1998, the UN Security Council demanded 
from the Military Forces of Serbia to terminate the armed hos-
tilities. The UN Security Council Resolution N1199 called for 
the ceasefire and required the parties to start dialogue be-
tween the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albanian Au-
thority of Kosovo. It would reduce the risks of a humanitarian 
catastrophe (Security Council Resolution, 1998).
The conflict resolution by diplomatic means culminated 
in February 1999 when the Contact Group (the USA, France, 
the Great Britain, Germany and Italy) reattempted a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict in Rambouillet (the surrounding area 
of Paris) by signing to the Peace Agreement. However, this 
attempt appeared to be vain. The Rambouillet Interim Agree-
ment was signed by the Kosovo Albanians. The agreement 
prescribed to guarantee a political autonomy to Kosovo. The 
government of Yugoslavia disagreed to sign the document 
(Rambouillet Interim Agreement).
By early March 1999, the situation had become grave. 
Thousands were suspected dead or missing, and hundreds 
of thousands of refugees massed on the Yugoslav-Macedo-
nian border were in immediate danger of losing their lives. 
A true humanitarian crisis now existed. At this time the UN 
should have intervened. However, the UN could not do so 
because the Security Council was deadlocked on whether to 
authorize military action. In the face of a paralyzed Security 
Council, and cognizant of the UN’s earlier failure to avert the 
crisis in Bosnia, NATO elected to act unilaterally. The fact that 
the Security Council would not act allows NATO to rightfully 
claim that all other means had been exhausted (Merriam J., 
2001, p.144).
The precedent set in Kosovo on exhaustion is clear and 
convincing - a state may unilaterally intervene only when all 
possible diplomatic initiatives have been pursued and the UN 
Security Council is unable to act. Future intervenors must en-
sure that they can establish an equally solid track record of 
diplomatic effort and UN deadlock (Merriam J., 2001, p.145).
Both the Kosovo leadership and the ethnic Albanian peo-
ple welcomed the NATO intervention in Kosovo.  On January 
2, 1999, moderate Albanian political leader Ibrahim Rugova 
called for direct NATO intervention to secure the peace. In his 
New Years message, Rugova stated “we are convinced that 
the international verification mission and permanent NATO at-
tention can calm down tensions in Kosovo.”  He went on to 
ask for NATO action, claiming that “only the deployment of 
NATO troops in Kosovo can bring about greater security for 
all the people - a precondition for the political settlement of the 
Kosovo problem.”  There was also wider evidence of a major-
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ity opinion among the oppressed populace. When NATO for-
ces finally occupied the region on June 12, 1999, enthu-
siastic and hopeful crowds waving banners welcomed the 
troops to Kosovo (Merriam J., 2001, p.146).
The self-imposed limited goals of the NATO operation 
have established a precedent for future humanitarian inter-
vention. From the outset, NATO declared that it would cease 
hostilities once the Yugoslav army withdrew from Kosovo. 
NATO pointedly avoided demanding that Yugoslavia sur-
render sovereignty over the region. By clearly outlining the 
goals of the operation, NATO sent a clear message to other 
would-be intervenors that this operation should not be used to 
justify military intervention for non-legitimate means (Merriam 
J., 2001, p.149).
It is also worth noting that the NATO humanitarian inter-
vention in Kosovo did not enjoy the full international support 
as it fell beyond the UN operation. In spite of this, the UN had 
never claimed that the Alliance was illegitimate in its action. 
Moreover, the UN sponsored the final NATO-Yugoslav peace 
talks signed on June 10, 1999. The NATO forces deployed in 
Kosovo under the auspices of the UN (Houston Simon, 1999, 
p. 1).  These unofficial links between NATO and the UN con-
firm the impression that the UN has accepted (through lack of 
any significant condemnatory response) the NATO interven-
tion (Merriam J., 2001, p.153).
In Security Council Resolution 1160, 31 March 1998 the 
Security Council acted under Chapter Vll to impose an arms 
embargo on the FRY in accordance with Article 41. It therefore 
understood the situation to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security. It called upon all States to “act strictly in 
conformity with this resolution” (Chinkin C., 2000,   p. 911).
In Security Council Resolution 1203, 24 October 1998 
specific obligations were directed towards the Kosovo Alba-
nian leadership: to comply with all relevant resolutions; to 
condemn terrorist actions; and to pursue its goals by peaceful 
means only. It also made demands of the Yugoslav Govern-
ment: compliance with all relevant resolutions; full implemen-
tation of the Agreements of 15 October 1998 between itself 
and NATO; compliance with the OSCE Verification Mission 
and the NATO Air Verification Mission over Kosovo; and to be 
mindful of its primary responsibility for the safety and security 
of all diplomatic personnel and for the safe return of refugees 
and displaced persons (Chinkin C., 2000,   p. 911).
Other States were only urged to provide personnel for 
the OSCE Verification Mission and resources for humanita-
rian assistance. It can be argued that the resolution envi-
saged the possibility of the use of force in its endorsement of 
NATO and OSCE agreements with Belgrade for the de-
ployment of verifiers within Kosovo and its affirmation in 
paragraph that “in the event of an emergency, action may 
be needed to ensure their safety and freedom of 
movement”(Chinkin C., 2000, pp. 911-912).
This wording, however, assumes the use of force only for 
a specific and limited reason—the protection of the Verifica-
tion Mission. It cannot be construed as a broader authoriza-
tion of force. In the event, the Verification Mission left Kosovo 
immediately before the commencement of Operation Allied 
Force so concern for its safety did not figure in the decision to 
use force (Chinkin C., 2000, p. 912).
It must be remembered that NATO’s action, as State 
practice, will itself contribute to the affirmation of international 
law and thought must therefore be given to the precedent ef-
fect of the action (Chinkin C., 2000, p. 925).
Conclusion
What is less clear is whether the intervention was “neces-
sary”, whether all other means of preventing the continuing 
violations of human rights had been sought, and whether the 
intervention was limited to humanitarian objectives (Chinkin 
C., 2000, p. 922).
A humanitarian intervention must be supported by many 
voices, and the existence of a humanitarian crisis be accept-
ed by the world community as a whole (Merriam J., 2001, 
pp.135-136).
According to the International Law, the UN Security 
Council is responsible for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. In spite of this unfortunately mostly the 
United Nations could not make decisions timely to avoid in-
ternational threats due to the interests of permanent mem-
bers which can use the veto power and impede significant 
decision-making process in the Security Council. Based on 
the above-mentioned, the regional international organizations 
and states had to take responsibilities for maintaining peace 
regardless of violations of the requirements of the UN Char-
ter. Simultaneously in such interventions, it is obligatory to 
meet preconditions and criteria of humanitarian intervention 
and achieve humanitarian purpose. Additionally, it should be 
taken into account that in the aforesaid situations there were 
no alternative tools to overcome the humanitarian crisis.
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